Oil War in 1973

Almost of the middle of the 6th day of October 1973, the world was receiving the news of the massive, military attack launched by the Egyptian and Syrian forces on the Israeli army, and on the two fronts of Sinai and the Golan Heights ... It is the war known as the "October War" or a "Ramadan War", which has witnessed for the first time the entry of oil as an effective Arab weapon in the battle. The Arab position was suffering from semi dissolution and recession towards Israel and the West in general. While Israel has been living on the dreams of the theory launched by General Zaire, Head of the Israeli Military Intelligence, which confirmed the inability of the Arabs to declare war against Israel. On the other hand, America has been totally biased towards Israel and was keen to keep the balance of power in the region in its favor.

This was the general scene for the Arab-Israeli arena on the eve of the 6th of October 1973 It is the story of war and the concomitant developments and transformations. We will depend on Mohammed Hassanein Haykals book The Road to Ramadan to narrate the events of the war.

During the middle of August 1973, six senior Syrian officers left Damascus heading to the Arab Republic of Egypt for recreation on the shores of the Mediterranean. This was a very normal journey, and the movements of these officers did not raise any doubts; they spend their days swimming, reading, and drinking tea and soft drinks, and therefore no one thought that these officers have the highest military ranks in the Syrian army, and that one of them was the Syrian Defense Minister Mustafa Tlass! With the sunset of the 22nd of August, these officers started some secret movements; they were infiltrating one after the other towards the Navy command station at Ras Alteen to meet the senior officers of the Egyptian army. At this meeting, the final touches were put on an Egyptian-Syrian military attack against the Israeli occupation forces and on the two fronts of Suez and the Golan Heights.

In the same period, and during the secret meetings of the Egyptians and the Syrians officers, the Egyptian President Anwar Sadat was doing an Arab tour that aimed to attract the attention of media and the intelligence sources to his visit, and to suggest that his visit to Syria was a normal tour, although he agreed in the same visit with the Syrian President Hafez al-Assad, to determine the zero hour.

On the other side, Israel was preparing to celebrate the Day of Atonement, It was assured that the letter sent to Egypt during the massive maneuvers implemented during the month of May of that same year. The thrust of the letter was that any attempt to cross the channel will mean the genocide of the attacking Egyptian forces. If we examine the defensive mechanisms on Bar Lev line, and the crowds of Israeli military forces and techniques, we will acknowledge that the feelings of the Israeli assurance were justified. But the Egyptian plan took this fact in its regard and decided to provide the Infantry Division, which was prepared to cross the channel, with huge quantities of Alstrellas Mullotkas missiles that were enough to confuse the enemy and provide the crossing infantry with an opportunity to disturb the balance of the Israeli forces with the beginning of the surprise attack, whilst awaiting for the arrival of the other installments of the Egyptian army. The plan achieved an overwhelming success, and the forces that crossed the Suez Canal were solid. Moshe Dayan, the Israeli Defense Minister then, said that the new missile did not disrupt the balance of the Israeli forces, but the overwhelming number of them at the first moment.

In fact, the surprise element was not confined to about eight thousand Egyptian troops equipped with missiles, and the latest weapons of the resistance armor and aircraft only, but also in the quality of the new war, played by the Egyptian soldier at a time when Israel believed that the Egyptian soldier scientifically ineligible for a war based on modern techniques. Israel did not expect that there were about 800000 Egyptian soldiers who would attack at once, and among these were more than 110000 troops, who were graduates from universities and institutes of higher education. The level of Arab resistance has changed, and we must employ these capabilities to gain success on the ground, as President Sadat said, who also obtained a promise from the Saudi monarch, King Faisal then, to use of the oil weapon if that is what he wanted.

King Faisal was confirming in his talks to the Arab leaders that "Oil is not a weapon of war; it is an economic force that we can use to purchase weapons for the battle. In contrast, Israel was confident that the Arabs can not use oil as a weapon in the battle, the Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Abyan, once said: "the only option for the Arabs is to sell oil because of the absence of other sources have. As for the United States, Israel has been considered an important factor to maintain America's interests in the region. At the same time they were aware that Arabs, who were unable to take a unified strong position against the United States and the West at 48 and 67, would not be able to take such a position now.

In the Arab arena, there have been calls here and there after the setback in 67 to use oil as a weapon in the hands of the Arabs, however, King Faisal was leading the opposing front against this view as we have said earlier. Perhaps the position of this front has proven its usefulness, at Khartoum Conference when the Petroleum Exporting Arab States contributed in supporting the war efforts and provided massive aid to the Frontline States.

Egypts share of this aid was 100 million sterling pounds annually; Jordan and Syria received substantial assistance. These aids had a direct role in emphasizing the views of King Faisal and silencing calls to cut off oil from the west; these aids have been able to aid Arabs and save what can be saved after the setback, and also succeeded in the restoration of the Arab military force. However, these attitudes started to change before October War These changes were exemplified in the warning message carried by Dr. Zaki Yamani, the Saudi Oil Minister, in the month of April 1973, for America that if it continues its policy in the Middle East in full bias to Israel because this will be linked by providing oil. It was also exemplified by the nationalization of most of the Arab oil companies on its territory. With the outbreak of October War, the atmosphere was completely ripe to use oil as a weapon in the ands of the Arabs against America, the supporters of the West and Israel.

After the consultations between the Arab countries, which produce and export oil, these States decided to adopt a unified position; they announced a ban on supplying the United States, Portugal, South Africa and the Netherlands with oil. They have also reduced the production rate of 10% each month and linked stopping this escalating reduction with the withdrawal of Israel from all the occupied Arab territories. The oil embargo proved effective at first glance and to a certain extent; the industrialized countries have suffered enormous difficulties, and many factories in America had to close its doors; oil consumption was legitimized in various European countries and unemployment increased... In the strategic and military aspects, the Western Europe Countries had taken the initiative to reject the use of their territories within the American-Israeli airlift, to provide it with weapons, ammunition and spare parts. As a result, a deep rift hit the Western alliance of the United States, and for the first time in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Europe announced the adoption of a common European-Arab dialogue, and asked some of these countries to consider the legitimate rights of Arabs and Palestinians. Moreover, the policy of the United States was criticized by prominent American figures, including some within the government, such as General George Brown, the Chief of Staff of the Joint Forces, who warned of the growing Zionist influence in America. But was this the desired effect? Was this the influence promised by the ideologists of the idea of using oil as a weapon in the battle?

Reality will later refer to the contrary, but we will not anticipate things.

An Exceptional Session.

Bahrain was among the Arab countries that were to attend the meeting, which was held in Kuwait on the 17th of October, to take a decision to cut off oil from America. Arab resolutions resulted from this meeting that were issued respectively from the capitals of the oil States, including Bahrain. In Manama, His Highness Sheikh Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa chaired the exceptional session of the Council of Ministers, on the 20th of October, in which the Council issued two important statements. The first statement announced that: "The government of Bahrain announces that, with regard to the position of the United States of America from the Arab nation, which is in the midst of its just and legitimate struggle against the Zionist enemy and in consistency with the requirements of national duty, that it decided to stop exporting oil to the United States starting from today. The second resolution stated that: "The government of the State of Bahrain announces the termination of the agreement signed in December 1971 with the government of America concerning granting facilities to the American ships in the port of Bahrain. The government had notified the American charge d'affaires of its intention to cancel the aforementioned convention if the American government did not change its biased policy towards the Israeli enemy; this happened when the American charge d'affaires was summoned by His Excellency Sheikh Mohammed Bin Mubarak Al-Khalifa, Minister of Foreign Affairs, on the 18th of October. The government has taken this step out of national interests and in response to the course of the fateful battle waged by the Arab nation in these present circumstances, and as a result of the hostile American position against the Arab nation. The government of Bahrain has also decided to work on the decisions taken by the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and that was in the meeting, which was held in Kuwait on the 17th of October. "

The Egyptian writer and journalist Mohamed Hassanein Heikal says in his book, "The road to Ramadan," that the Arabs did not have a clear plan that was set in advance to use the weapon of oil. In fact the consequences of banning the export of oil were very ironic, despite its positive results, which were directly at the beginning of the embargo, there were unexpected ... this story will tell us why.

In Egypt, the Foreign Ministry formed a working group to study the methods to act regarding the feasibility of using oil as a weapon, but the results of the study were not specific. At a very appropriate time, a document reached the hands of officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that played a major role in steering the oil policy, and it was a few days before the war. The story of this document, started through the project of the Center of Strategic Studies of "Al-Ahram" Newspaper when Dr. Mustafa Khalil, Former Deputy Prime Minister of Industry and Mineral Wealth-and the Prime Minister after the war. was invited to put a study on the energy crisis in the United States and its implications on the Arab states. In the 1st of October, Dr. Khalil concluded that study and placed it at the disposal of President Sadat.

An Exceptional Session.

This was the thrust of the report, who Heikal considers an integrated strategic study. Indeed, the report was no more than impressions and predictions consistent with the Egyptian viewpoint regarding the use of the oil weapon. In general, this report and its recommendations was one of the documents carried by the Egyptian delegation, which went immediately to meet with the Saudi leadership to bring the matter to King Faisal. In the first meeting between the Egyptians and King Faisal in his own office at the royal palace in Riyadh, the Saudi side included Prince Fahd bin Abdul Aziz, Minister of Interior, Dr. Rashad Pharoon , the closest advisor of King Faisal, and the Egyptian side included Mr. Said Miri, Mustafa Khalil, the author of the report, and Brigadier Saed Al Qadi, who came equipped with illustrative charts to demonstrate the progress of the battle. King Faisal listened attentively to the presentation submitted by Mr. Miri, Mustafa Khalil and was nodding from time to time.

It was clear that the analysis presented by Al Qadi had aroused the interest of the King. It was clear at the second meeting, which was held after breakfast, that King Faisal was more optimistic, and he confirmed this when he said: "you have made us all very proud. In the past, we could not raise our heads but now we do, you have done your duty and worked hard in order to do so. Your towns were destroyed. The least the other Arab countries can do is to aid you financially, and with any military equipment owned." At that meeting, the King decided to provide an urgent gift to Egypt of $ 200 million, pointing out that army units from the Saudi Army are on their way to the Syrian front. The King added by saying: "What we give is not charity, and our money is much less than the lives and the sacrifices you give.

After that, King Faisal asked the Egyptians for the long-term practical steps that should be pursued; they advised him to summon the American charge d'affaires, and give him a summary of the points that have been discussed here. It is worth mentioning here that The American Ambassador James Watkins was absent. He was in fact one of the most prominent experts of the governmental energy agency. Moreover, the delegation also advised the King that the Saudi Foreign Minister meets with the American President Nixon in Washington to explain the same issue!!

Here, however, it is difficult to accept the idea that Egyptian officials decide king Faisals political approach, but we will remain with Heikals narration of the events, he adds: "King Faisal asked the Egyptian delegation: What about our friends the Libyans? What have they given you? Mr. Mari answered: Al Gaddafi offered $40 million Dollars, and four million tons of crude oil. The King said: this is not enough. It might have been better if the Libyans spent their money on the battle instead of fomenting instability in other Arab countries!". After that, the Egyptian delegation went to Kuwait and met with the Emir of the country. In Bahrain, the delegation met with His Highness the late Emir and His Highness the Prime Minister, who held long discussions that lasted for more than two hours. It became clear that the officials in Bahrain were eager to know all about the military front and were determined to contribute their part in this fateful battle.

But were the results aspiring to the hopes of the Arabs, in particular the Arab street, in this unanimity to embargo oil.

To answer this question, it is clear now the scope of strategic domination of the oil companies on the fortunes of the world and the Arab wealth in particular. It also shows, with more precision, that the theory of the late King Faisal bin Abdul Aziz was more correct and more broad-minded from the counterpart theory, which has called for the use of oil as a weapon in the battle.

During the meeting of Arab oil ministers in Kuwait on the 17th of October to coordinate a unified Arab oil policy, Saudi Arabia adopted a proposal to reduce production by 15%. However, President Sadat considered this a great sacrifice! He suggested that the reduction rate be only by 5% with a substantial increase in prices.

The result was a fluctuating increase in the price of oil and a modest reduction in production, which means that these resolutions were like a delicious cake for the oil companies; the American tanks were filled with cash! The result of these decisions was opposite to expectations and intensions, when it was supposed that an energy crisis will sweep the United States, and eventually be subject to the mercy of the Arab boycott. The profits of the American oil companies reached a mythical unrecorded level, and the Arabs share of increasing prices was $60000 millions; this figure is a meager share compared to the profits of the American oil companies! The decrease in oil production should have affected but instead it hit Japan and the Western European Countries, the competitors of America.

It was clear that the Arab countries, who were calling for an oil embargo, have underestimated the game, and the winner of this battle was the American oil companies ... Yet, regardless of these results, oil has been able to unite the Arabs in one resolution, and became a weapon that entered the battle for the first time.

Now a question might rise on the surface of the case that need to be answered ... How have America managed to neutralize the effect of this weapon, which Arabs thought to be a magic sword capable of doing miracles?

To answer this question, we must recall the crisis in the United States in the winter of 1972, which is known as the "energy crisis"; America has suffered in that winter from shortage of oil that even the fuel stations closed, and the homes and offices were without heating. It was clear that America lived a crisis, but in fact the United States has large reserves of coal, uranium and oil; it has the largest sources of energy in the world. The problem, however, which has plagued America, was its inability to develop a real contingency plan. This problem has been overcome upon October war, because now it had the ability to put a more coordinated contingency plan.

In contrast, the damage to Japan, for example, was much more as it relies on the importation of 90% of its oil needs from the Arabian Gulf region. Europe, although its dependence on the Arab oil is less than Japan, does not have any oil concessions in the region, in comparison with America that owns about 60% of the Arab oil mines!

Consequently, the oil weapon entirely unsuccessful, although it was able to produce a bombshell that brought attention to the Arab cause.

Here and before we leave this period of time, we must of course, take a look at the conditions and feelings, which was then in Bahrain; the hearts of Bahrainis, during the war, was immersed in the news of the two fronts: Suez, and the Golan.

The streets and neighborhoods of Bahrain have witnessed meetings and gatherings to donate funds, blood, and material things. In addition, the Bahraini souls were tensed with the battle news, and what radio and news agencies broadcast of the Arab victories, and of course, this coincided with their deep concern of the American and Israeli threats. Some even expected a full-scale war that would reach to Bahrain.

At the official level, His Highness directives were preparing the country in its highest readiness in anticipation of the worst that can happen. As a result of the consultations and the tireless efforts of the brothers :the Emir of the country and His Highness the Prime Minister, a law ordinance was issued, by Law No. 24 of 1973, to establish the Supreme Council for Defense, and its chairmanship was assigned to His Highness Sheikh Khalifa Bin Salman Al-Khalifa, the Prime Minister. This Council has been entrusted with the task of supervising the defense policy and supervising the military plans for the defense of Bahrain, in addition to the insurance of the citizens needs and to take all security precautions to ensure the integrity of the country and citizens.

This was on the immediate term, but as for the long term, that period was appropriate for drawing lessons and experiences. The repercussions of what happened on the use of the oil weapon has made His Highness Sheikh Khalifa absolutely convinced of the need to reconsider the agreements signed with the oil companies in Bahrain in order to obtain further concessions. Therefore, a new agreement was singed between the government and the oil company and became effective on the 1st of January 1974, Bahrain now got %60 of the excavation rights and companies utilities, and it has also the right to possess new gas wells, at their expense, and that these wells were owned by Bahrain. Thus, His Highness Sheikh Khalifas policy has succeeded and the directives of His Highness the late Emir Sheikh Isa Bin Salman, in moving Bahrain through this difficult, dramatic phase that Bahrain faced at a crucial time when it had just emerged from the issue of the "leftist political movements" and the issue of independence and the Iranian threats.